This article argues that a change in institutional strategy enables The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to manage its great power relations and prevent their abrupt political intrusion into the region by providing the policy options of pursuing institutional balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, or co-option. ASEAN’s strategy is not only to choose optimal policy under a changing security environment, but also to create an institutional division of labour by proliferating ASEAN-led institutions to ensure, as far as possible, regional autonomy and Member States’ security. Changes in ASEAN’s institutional strategy occur when its Member States expect a change in the regional distribution of power. However, due to constraints created by the existing institutional design it is difficult to make any drastic alteration to the institutional strategy unless a radical change in the regional power configuration occurs. This article examines the cases of East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)/ADMM-Plus during the period 2005–2016, the comparison of which illuminates the causes and processes of their strategy change and helps to deepen our understanding of the roles of regional security institutions.

Cite

Kei Koga, ASEAN’s Evolving Institutional Strategy: Managing Great Power Politics in South China Sea Disputes, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 11, Issue 1, Spring 2018, Pages 49–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pox016